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1. INTRODUCTION
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) like the Grameen Bank or
the Banco do Nordeste in Brazil are non-profit organizations
that give small loans to low-income borrowers, typically at
low interest rates. Their main aim is to contribute to the so-
cioeconomic development of the regions where they operate
while remaining financially sound.
In recent years, there has been a significant growth in the
number of online microlending sites that connect individuals
to small businesses led by low-income citizens. This type of
social lending platforms allow individuals from all over the
world to explore large online databases of businesses that
require small loans to succeed; and citizens without access
to formal banking systems to borrow the money they need
to carry out their projects. Understanding lending and bor-
rowing activity is critical to improve the way microfinance
services work. However, although there exists an important
body of work regarding traditional (offline) microfinance,
the research in the area of online microlending is much more
limited. Previous work in traditional microlending has cov-
ered various research questions including the relationship
between gender and loan reimbursement [7] or the impact
that MFI ratings have on total investments and growth [4,
11]. Nevertheless, there only exist a few studies that fo-
cus on the analysis of online microlending platforms [6, 2].
However, many aspects that have been typically addressed
in traditional microlending studies such as the role that MFI
ratings or teams play in the lending process, have not been
fully analyzed online.
In this paper, we propose an in-depth study of lending be-
haviors in Kiva using a mix of quantitative and large-scale
data mining techniques. Kiva is a non-profit organization
that offers an online platform to connect lenders with bor-
rowers. Their site, kiva.org, allows citizens to microlend
small amounts of money to entrepreneurs (borrowers) from
different countries. The borrowers are always affiliated with
a Field Partner (FP) which can be a microfinance institution
(MFI) or other type of local organization that has partnered
with Kiva. Field partners give loans to selected businesses
based on their local knowledge regarding the country, the
business sector including agriculture, health or manufacture
among others, and the borrower. Our objective is to under-
Bloomberg Data for Good Exchange Conference.
25-Sep-2016, New York City, NY, USA.
stand the relationship between lending activity and various
features offered by the online platform. Specifically, we focus
on two research questions: (i) the role that MFI ratings play
in driving lending activity and (ii) the role that various loan
features have in the lending behavior. The first question an-
alyzes whether there exists a relationship between the MFI
ratings – that lenders can explore online – and their lending
volumes. The second research question attempts to under-
stand if certain loan features – available online at Kiva– such
as the type of small business, the gender of the borrower, or
the loan’s country information might affect the way lenders
lend.
We carry out our analysis with a dataset collected by Schaaf
et al. in combination with the loan-lender data snapshots
provided by Kiva and a set of socioeconomic indicators pro-
vided by the World Bank Open Data website. The resulting
four-month dataset contains over a million different lend-
ing actions (1, 217, 627), 47, 790 loans and 263, 121 unique
lenders. We expect that this analysis will provide Kiva and
other similar microlending platforms with findings and tech-
niques to better cater to their lenders so as to facilitate and
enhance lending activity.
2. MFI RATINGANDLENDINGACTIVITY
The first research question focuses on understanding the re-
lationship between Field Partner ratings and lending activ-
ity. For that purpose, we analyze the relationship between
the number of lending actions to specific loans and the rating
of the FPs associated to those loans.
Kiva statistics reveal that the distribution of loans per rat-
ing is not homogeneous with a large number of loans associ-
ated to Field Partners with ratings three (> 140K) and zero
(> 80K), while other FP ratings have considerably smaller
number of loans (≈ 50K, on average). Similarly, a large
number of Field Partners (90) have ratings between 2.5 and
3.5 while higher and lower ratings are associated to fewer
FPs. For example, there exist only 24 FPs with ratings be-
tween 1 and 2 or 31 between 4 and 5. In order to account
for these differences and to be able to compare and correlate
lending actions across ratings, we define normalized lending
actions as the total number of lending actions to a given rat-
ing divided by the number of loans associated to FPs with
that rating: l.ar =
l.ar
loansr
where l.ar represents the total
number of individual lending actions to FPs with rating r
and loansr the total number of loans offered by FPs with
rating r.
ar
X
iv
:1
60
9.
09
57
1v
1 
 [c
s.C
Y]
  3
0 S
ep
 20
16
Figure 1: Normalized lending actions per FP rating.
To test the relationship between lending activity and ratings,
we compute the correlation coefficients between the sum of
all individual lending actions per rating (l.ar) and the rat-
ings themselves. Figure 1 shows the normalized activity for
each rating value. Since Kiva expresses the ratings as zero
or a number between one and five in increments of 0.5, the
sample size for the correlation analysis is only ten. Given
that small size, we cannot guarantee normality or linearity.
For that reason we compute correlations for both paramet-
ric (Pearson’s) and non-parametric (Spearman’s rank) tests.
Our analysis shows a strong positive correlation between the
two with a correlation coefficient of r(8) = 0.78 and p-value
of p = 0.006. Similarly, Spearman’s rank produced a correla-
tion coefficient of ρ(8) = 0.74 (with p = 0.01). Additionally,
we also performed a linear regression on the ratings to see
how predictive these are of the lending activity. We obtained
an F (1, 8) = 10.24 with p = 0.01 and an adjusted R2 = 0.61.
Thus, the tests determine that the trend in Figure 1 approx-
imately follows a monotonic linear trend. This means that
the higher the rating of a Field Partner, the larger the num-
ber of lending actions we observe. In fact, lenders appear to
be more prone to lend to loans managed by Field Partners
with higher ratings. Similar results have been reported in
one-to-one lending systems [11].
To better characterize the relationship between lending ac-
tivity and ratings, we are also interested in understand-
ing what type of lenders are more prone to lend to highly
rated Field Partners. Specifically, we seek lending patterns
that exclusively characterize lenders whose lending activity
is mostly focused on high FP ratings. For that purpose, we
will first model each individual lender in our dataset with
six different lending features: (1) number of loans that the
lender has lent money to, (2) invitee count, (3) number of
days since she has been a member at Kiva, (4) average team
size of the teams the lender is a member of, (5) number of
distinct FP’s the lender has lent to and (6) entropy of the
lender’s lending behavior.
Variables one to five are computed straightforward from the
four-month dataset. As for the lending entropy, we compute
it as the Kolmogorov Complexity of the four-month lending
actions’ time series for each individual [5]. Higher complex-
ity values are associated to burstier behaviors where lending
patterns are harder to model as opposed to low complexity
values which we associate to more stable, planned lending
Figure 2: Box plot for median individual loan counts
versus ratings. Boxes represent the 1st and 3rd
quartiles and values outside the box are values
within 1.5 the interquartile distance (1.5*Q3-Q1).
Figure 3: Box plots for median individual complex-
ity values that characterize lending patterns.
behaviors e.g., lenders that lend approximately once every
two weeks will have lower complexity values than those who
lend more unpredictably.
To carry out this analysis, we characterize each individual in
our dataset with the six lending features. For each feature
and rating, we compute their median values and compare
them. For simplicity purposes, we consider five different
ratings: zero, one ([1,2)), two ([2,3)), three ([3,4)) and four
([4,5]). Our results reveal differences for two features: (1)
loan count and (6) complexity. Figure 2 and Figure 3 show
the mean loan count and the mean lending complexity for
lenders with a majority of lending actions on one of the five
ratings, respectively. We observe that lenders whose lending
activity mostly focuses on FP’s with ratings four or higher,
appear to lend to a larger number of loans while showing
lower lending complexity than lenders that focus their ac-
tivity on lower ratings. In fact, it appears that lenders that
concentrate on higher ratings might have more stable lend-
ing behaviors probably implying regularly planned lending
decisions. On the other hand, lenders whose majority lend-
ing actions are mostly focused on FPs with lower ratings,
appear to lend to fewer loans and their behaviors are far
more complex, which might reveal burstier, more impulsive
behavior. Without claiming causality, these results might
suggest that offering more highly ranked Field Partners on
Kiva’s website could also potentially increase lending ac-
tivity. Additionally, given that planned lending decisions
appear to be related to higher lending volumes, Kiva could
offer planning tools to lenders such as lending calendars or
lending reminders, which might also help to increase the
lending activity of their users.
Name Code CC p-value q-value
Urban population (in largest city) EN.URB.LCTY.UR.ZS r(55) = 0.332 0.01 0.019
Agriculture (added value) NV.AGR.TOTL.KD r(51) = −0.23 0.07 0.08
Strength of legal rights index (0=weak to 10=strong) IC.LGL.CRED.XQ r(54) = −0.27 0.03 0.045
Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP) NV.IND.MANF.ZS r(46) = −0.22 0.01 0.019
Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP) FS.AST.DOMS.GD.ZS r(52) = −0.2 0.01 0.020
Incidence of tuberculosis (per 100,000 people) SH.TBS.INCD r(56) = −0.23 0.07 0.08
Table 1: Pearson’s correlations with FDR adjustments between normalized lending actions andWB indicators.
3. LOAN FEATURES
Our second research question seeks to understand the rela-
tionship between lending activity and features that charac-
terize a loan including: (1) country of the loan, (2) sector:
agriculture, retail or health among others, (3) size of the
loan: individual or group-based and (4) gender of the bor-
rowers in the loan. To eliminate the bias we normalize the
number of lending actions to a loan feature (country, sec-
tor, gender or size) by dividing the total number of lending
actions by the number loans associated to that feature as:
l.af =
l.af
loansf
with f ∈ {c, s, g, z} where f represents one of
the loan features: the country c, the sector s, the gender g
or the size z of the loan; l.af the number of lending actions
to loans with feature f and loansf the total number of loans
with that feature.
To evaluate how lending actions and the country of the
loan relate to each other, we first characterize each borrower
country by a set of over 1000 socioeconomic indicators ex-
tracted from the World’s Bank Open Data website. Next,
we compute Pearson’s correlations between the total num-
ber of lending actions (l.ac) to each borrower country c and
the values for each socioeconomic variable. Given the large
number of correlations performed (over 1000), we need to
adjust the p-values i.e., control for the Type I error (False
Positives). Bonferroni correction is one of the most com-
mon approaches to adjust for multiple testing. However,
given the large set of correlations that we perform, Bonfer-
roni’s p-values would be too stringent e.g., for a Type I error
rate of 0.01, it would require a p > 0.00001. For that rea-
son, we apply instead the False Discovery Rate (FDR) which
controls the fraction of positive detections that are wrong.
Specifically, we use the Benjamini-Yekutieli’s FDR adjust-
ment and report the correlation results together with their
p-values and their q-values i.e., percentage of false discover-
ies accepted for that test, also known as adjusted p-values
[1].
Table 1 shows some of the most relevant findings (the ma-
jority with q ≤ 0.05). We observe a significant positive
correlation between a country’s urban population and the
lending activity it receives (recall that lending activity is
normalized by the number of loans in the country). It ap-
pears that countries with a larger urban population have
a higher probability of benefiting from lending than coun-
tries that are more rural. To promote more heterogeneous
lending activity, Kiva could explore putting online lending
recommendations to drive lending activity towards countries
that benefit the least at each moment in time. Interestingly,
we also observe a negative correlation between lending activ-
ity towards a country and its agricultural added value. This
shows that Kiva lenders are lending more to countries whose
agricultural production is poor and in need (the smaller the
production, the larger the lending activity).
Other correlations indicate that larger lending activity is
associated to countries with less manufacturing which is in-
directly related to job creation. In fact, the lack of manufac-
turing industries can negatively impact the creation of jobs.
As a result, Kiva appears to be successfully driving lend-
ing activity towards countries where job creation is harder
to achieve. On the other hand, lending activity is nega-
tively correlated to the strength of legal rights in the country,
which might reveal a lending activity focused on supporting
development and indirectly the improvement of freedom and
rights in borrower countries.
To understand better lending actions, it is important to real-
ize that lenders can also be influenced by the socioeconomic
conditions of their own countries. In an attempt to disen-
tangle which factors play a role, we also analyze the rela-
tionship between borrower countries and the lending activ-
ity of lender countries characterized by their socioeconomic
indicators. For that purpose, we compute the total num-
ber of lending actions per lender country to each borrower
country. Next, we characterize each lender country with its
socioeconomic indicators extracted from the World’s Bank
Open Data. For each indicator, we create three groups of
lender countries depending on whether the country has a
low, medium or high value for that indicator, and com-
pute their total lending activity to each borrower country.
This will allow us to refer to the lending activity of, for
example, lender countries that have a low GDP or lender
countries with high mobile cellular subscriptions. Next, for
each lender indicator (GDP, inflation,...) and group (low,
medium or high), we compute Pearson’s correlations (ad-
justed with FDR) between their lending activities to each
borrower country and the values for each socioeconomic indi-
cator from the borrower countries. These tests might reveal
important relationships between groups of lender countries
and borrower countries being able to draw statements such
as the lower the GDP of the borrower country, the larger
lending activity they attract from countries with high GDP.
Table 2 shows some of the most relevant correlations be-
tween the indicators of the borrower countries previously dis-
cussed and the lending activity they receive from countries
with certain low, medium or high socioeconomic values. We
observe a positive correlation between lender countries that
have low average interests on external debt and borrower
countries with large urban populations. As discussed earlier,
borrower countries with large urban populations seem to re-
ceive more lending activity which they appear to be getting
from lender countries that are not strangled by their external
debt payments. We also observe that lender countries where
most citizens finish primary education have a lending activ-
Borrower Country Lender Country CC p q
EN.URB.LCTY.UR.ZS Low Average Interests on External Debt (DT.INR.OFFT ) r(51) = 0.38 0.004 0.01
NV.AGR.TOTL.KD Persistence to Last Grade Primary Education (SE.PRM.PRSL.ZS) r(49) = 0.44 0.002 0.008
IT.CEL.SETS High Youth Literacy Rates (SE.ADT.1524.LT.ZS) r(53) = −0.35 0.001 0.006
NV.IND.MANF.ZS High Military Expenditure (MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS) r(49) = −0.45 0.001 0.006
SH.TBS.INCD Low Prevalence of overweight children (SH.STA.OWGH.ZS) r(46) = 0.38 0.003 0.008
Table 2: Pearson’s correlations with FDR adjustments between lending activity of lender countries charac-
terized by low, medium or high socioeconomic indicators and borrower countries socioeconomic values’.
ity that is positively correlated to the borrower’s agricul-
tural production (NV.AGR.TOTL.KD). This implies that
the little lending activity that borrower countries with large
agricultural production manage to bring in (as shown in Ta-
ble 1) is mostly from lender countries with high education
levels. In terms of mobile penetration (IT.CEL.SETS),
Table 1 showed a tendency to lend more to countries with
low penetration rates, and Table 2 shows that it is mostly
countries with high youth literacy rates, the ones who gen-
erate that lending activity. We also observe that countries
with high military expenditure (MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS)
focus their lending activity on borrower countries with low
manufacturing rates (NV.IND.MANF.ZS). Additionally,
lending actions to countries with high incidence of tuber-
culosis appear to be mostly driven by countries with low
prevalence of overweight children (SH.STA.OWGH.ZS).
We posit that countries that are aware of the importance of
health related issues might be focusing on lending to coun-
tries who could improve their health status. To summarize,
it is fair to say that the general trend is for countries with
higher rates of educated citizens and larger economic activ-
ity to be more prone to lend, which is a feature that has also
been found in official development assistance [2].
Finally, to analyze the relationship between lending activity
and the sector of the loan, the size of the loan and the gen-
der, we take a different approach to account for the discrete
nature of the variables. We compute the median number
of normalized lending actions and its standard deviations
for: each type of loan sector (health, agriculture, retail,
etc.); each group size range(1, [2-10], [10-20] and [20-48])
and for each gender (female, female or both for loans that
go to a group of borrowers rather than an individual). In
terms of sectors, we observe a larger median number of nor-
malized lending actions in the retail sector with (M=3.2,
IQR=6.2), followed by the agricultural (M=3.1,IQR=6.2)
and food (M=2.9, IQR=6.1) sectors, where M represents
the median and IQR the interquartile range. The other sec-
tors showed considerably lower values, although these dif-
ferences were not statistically significant. This shows that
lenders appear to favor the retail sector which is probably
far more present in urban than rural settings. In terms of
group size, we observe that individuals appear to focus their
lending activity on loans which are borrowed by one person
(M=2.3, IQR=3) or group loans of up to ten individuals
(M=4.1, IQR=6). Larger loans are not as favored which is
also coherent with the findings reported in [3, 9]. Finally,
gender presents a slight minimal advantage for female loans
(M=2.4, IQR=3) versus male (M=2.1, IQR=3), but noth-
ing conclusive, although similar results have been reported
in [6, 10, 8]. These lending patterns might be a result of
individual preferences or rather a consequence of the way
Kiva presents the information on their website.
4. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a large-scale analysis of the role that
various features might play on online microlending environ-
ments. Our results show that lenders appear to favor highly
rated Field Partners that manage to drive more lending ac-
tivity. Additionally, we have observed that lenders seem to
lend to loans in sectors that are often times aligned with of-
ficial aid donors. We believe that our work provides a better
understanding of online microlending behaviors as well as a
set of suggestions to improve the services that microfinance
platforms currently offer to their lenders and borrowers.
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